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An Alternative to Death-Qualification: The Nonunanimous Penalty Jury 
By Jane Tucker1 
 
Abstract: Eliminating jurors for cause based on their opinions concerning the death-penalty 
(“death-qualification”) is a widespread practice that has been upheld by multiple Supreme Court 
cases, but which has been widely criticized for resulting in juries that studies have shown to be 
more conviction-prone, and biased toward the prosecution, in addition to being unrepresentative 
of the community at large. This Note offers a possible solution to the problems caused by death-
qualification at both the guilt and penalty phases, unlike those proposed thus far: specifically, the 
elimination of death-qualification altogether, coupled with the relaxation of the unanimity 
requirement at the penalty phase.
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“Let’s get these conscientious objectors out of the way, without wasting any time on 
them,”2 the judge presiding over William Witherspoon’s 1960 murder trial3 said before quickly 
eliminating nearly half of the potential jurors based on their views about the death penalty.4 Only 
five of the forty-seven eliminated on such grounds stated explicitly that they could never vote for 
the ultimate punishment; the vast majority of the others merely admitted to having 
“‘conscientious or religious scruples’ against its infliction ‘in the proper case.’”5 The result was a 
jury full of only those who expressed no qualms about condemning a man to death. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Witherspoon received that very sentence. 
 In Witherspoon v. Illinois,6 the Supreme Court deplored such practices, then widespread, 
as resulting in a “tribunal organized to condemn a man to death.”7 In response, the Court found 
that the state may not exclude members of the venire who express reservations against the death 
penalty unless they either make it unmistakably clear that they would automatically vote against 
the death penalty regardless of the evidence, or that their attitude toward the death penalty would 
prevent them from impartially determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence.8 Many critics 
question, however, whether despite the Court’s introduction of limitations intended to preclude 
such a result, juries selected under the system that arose from the Witherspoon opinion, 
commonly referred to as “death-qualification,”9 are not perhaps still precisely the sort of 
                                                        
2 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 514 (1968) (quoting trial judge). 
3 People v. Witherspoon, 36 Ill. 2d 471, 224 N.E.2d 259 (1967). 
4 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 513. 
5 Id. at 515. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 521. 
8 Id. at 522 n.21. 
9 Veniremen who survive this process are said to be “death-qualified.” I will use both these terms 
throughout the course of the paper. Furthermore, while the death-qualification of jurors functions to 
ensure both that the jurors selected would be able to vote for the death penalty, and that they would be 
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“hanging jury” that the Court denounced.10 Empirical findings suggesting that individuals 
qualified to be jurors under the Witherspoon standard may differ from the general population on 
a number of dimensions relevant to their willingness to convict and to favor the prosecution11 
have lead to charges that the “impartial jury” mandate of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 
is not being met.12 That the Court relaxed the standard for exclusion, and gave more deference to 
trial judges under Wainwright v. Witt13 presents further cause for worry, as both developments 
ensure that a broader swath of potential jurors are being excluded based on their views of capital 
punishment,14 resulting in juries possessing the aforementioned qualities to an even greater 
extent. Finally, evidence that peremptory strikes are often used to remove any remaining 
members of the venire who have expressed scruples about the death penalty15 further suggests 
that the jurors who do make the cut possess a unique readiness to “condemn a man to death.” 
 Still, some form of death-qualification is generally regarded as necessary to balance the 
State’s interests with the defendant’s constitutional rights. More often than not, even those who 
oppose it on the basis of it resulting in “conviction-prone” juries aim their criticisms at its use for 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
able to impartially determine the defendant’s guilt, the criticism on the topic generally construes “death-
qualification” more narrowly, to refer only to the former aspect, taking no issue with the latter. I too will 
use the term to denote this narrower concept. 
10 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523. 
11 See, e.g., Claudia L. Cowan, William C. Thompson & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, The Effects of Death 
Qualification on Jurors’ Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 53 (1984); George L. Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a “Death Qualified” Jury on the Guilt 
Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971); William C. Thompson, Claudia L. Cowan, Phoebe 
C. Ellsworth & Joan C. Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Proneness: The Translation 
of Attitudes into Verdicts, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95 (1984). 
12 E.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 198 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
13 469 U.S. 412, 426-431 (1985). 
14 See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 191 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[j]udicial applications of 
the Witherspoon standard have also expanded the class of jurors excludable for cause”). The more recent 
case of Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007), lends further credence to such concerns. See Brooke A. 
Thompson, Criminal Law—The Supreme Court Expands the Witt Principles to Exclude A Juror Who 
Would Follow the Law. Uttecht v. Brown, 127 S. Ct. 2218 (2007), 30 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 845, 
877 (2008) 
15 See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 190-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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assembling the jury responsible for the guilt determination, while accepting its utility for the 
penalty phase of the trial.16 
 In this paper, I will argue that there may be an alternative to the death-qualification of 
jurors that courts and critics have largely overlooked. Specifically, I will argue that allowing 
penalty phase determinations to be made by a supermajority largely achieves the same goals as 
death-qualification while avoiding its serious problems. Part I of this paper presents a brief 
overview of death-qualification, the primary criticisms leveled against it, and how the Court has 
responded to some of them. Part II briefly assesses some alternative solutions proposed by 
critics, and explains why they ultimately fall short in solving the problems that death-
qualification causes. Part III presents a possible alternative that would eliminate the need for 
death-qualification altogether, and discusses some of its merits, in addition to addressing some 
anticipated objections to such a proposal. Part IV offers a brief conclusion. 
 
II. DEATH-QUALIFICATION AND ITS CRITICS 
 
A. Death-Qualification: The Court’s Compromise 
 
 The solution at which the Witherspoon Court arrived has since been conceived as the 
Court’s effort to strike a balance between interests of the State and the defendant that are in 
tension with one another. The State’s interests in question have been described by the Court’s 
later jurisprudence on the topic alternately as “obtaining jurors who can follow their instructions 
                                                        
16 See, e.g., Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 203-206 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Susan D. Rozelle, The Principled 
Executioner: Capital Juries’ Bias and the Benefits of True Bifurcation, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 769 (2006); 
Richard Salgado, Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for A Lesser Evil in the Capital Juror 
Death-Qualification Process in United States v. Green, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 519 (2005). 
6 
and obey their oaths”17 and “excluding those jurors whose opposition to capital punishment 
would not allow them to view the proceedings impartially and who therefore might frustrate 
administration of a State’s death penalty scheme,”18 and are generally viewed nowadays to 
encompass both ideas. The defendant’s relevant interests have been treated within the Court’s 
jurisprudence as primarily centering around the impartial jury guarantee of the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.19 
 The solution at which the Court has thus far arrived in an effort to balance these two sets 
of interests has been to allow the State to strike potential jurors for cause based on their views 
about the death penalty, but to limit the circumstances in which they may do so. In Witherspoon, 
the Court ruled that a potential juror could not struck unless he made it “unmistakably clear” that 
he would automatically refuse to vote for death or his views on the subject would “prevent [him] 
from making an impartial decision as to the defendant’s guilt,”20 a standard that was then relaxed 
under Witt to allow the dismissal of jurors whose views would “prevent or substantially impair 
the performance of his duties as a juror,”21 and grant deference to the trail judge in making such 
a determination.22  
 
                                                        
17 Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44 (1980). 
18 Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 416 (1985). 
19 E.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 passim (1986); Witt, 469 U.S. passim; Adams, 448 U.S. 38, 
passim; Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 passim (1968). A second right that has been referenced, 
though not treated with quite the same level of gravity and uniformity, has been that of the fair cross-
section requirement embedded within the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees. See Witherspoon, 
391 U.S. at 519-520 (“[A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can 
do little more . . . than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or 
death. Yet . . . a jury composed exclusively of [people who believe in the death penalty] cannot [do so]”); 
See also id. at 528 (Douglas, J., concurring) (discussing the concept of the jury as representing “fair cross-
section of the community” and “the conscience of the community”). But see Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173 
(declining to extend the fair-cross section requirement to the composition of petit juries). 
20 Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21. 
21 Witt, 469 U.S. at 420 (quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45) (emphasis omitted). 
22 Id. at 426-431. 
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B. Criticisms of Death-Qualification 
 
 This solution has been widely criticized, both for its practical and theoretical 
implications. I will briefly review some of the criticisms here. 
 Over the decades following Witherspoon, a number of studies investigated the possible 
implications of death-qualification.23 A few key findings were confirmed over and over again. 
First, those whose survey responses indicated that they would survive the death-qualification 
process were found to possess attitudes favoring the prosecution, and to be more likely to convict 
(a quality referred to “conviction-proneness”) than the average population when reviewing the 
same evidence, calling into question whether juries selected by such methods are truly 
“impartial” within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.24 Second, Witherspoon qualification 
was found to disqualify a significant segment of the population,25 leading to concerns of whether 
such juries are truly constitute a representative cross-section of the community.26 Third, death-
qualification has been shown to disqualify a disproportionate number of blacks and women,27 
exacerbating the already considerable concerns over underrepresentation of these groups.28 
Finally, evidence suggests that the process of death-qualification might actually predispose jurors 
                                                        
23 For a detailed review, see the district court opinion in Lockhart, Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 
1291-1305 (E.D. Ark. 1983). 
24 See, e.g., studies cited supra note 10. 
25 See, e.g., Edward J. Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-
Qualified Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1970); Edward J. 
Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases Make the Jury More Likely to Convict? 
Some Evidence from California, 3 WOODROW WILSON L.J. 11 (1980); Ellsworth, Phoebe C. & 
Fitzgerald, Robert, Due Process vs. Crime Control: Death-Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW AND 
HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1984). 
26 See, e.g., studies cited supra note 24. 
27 Id. 
28 See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Constitutionalizing Jury Selection in Criminal Cases: A Critical 
Evaluation, 86 GEO. L.J. 945 (1998); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1261 (2000).  
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to think that the defendant must be guilty.29 All of these findings have raised concerns as to the 
ability of the criminal justice system to meet the constitutional mandates of the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. The narrowing of the standard for exclusion under Witt has only 
increased the gravity of which concerns.30 
 The way that death-qualification appears to operate in the real-life courtroom setting 
strengthens these criticisms. The broad discretion awarded to judges under Witt makes it easier 
for judges to exclude a broader swath of jurors without risking reversal, increasing the likelihood 
of questionable dismissals.31 Moreover, the existence of practices among prosecutors, including 
the use of peremptory strikes to exclude any death-scrupled veniremen remaining after death-
qualification,32 and, more controversially, the strategy of seeking of the death penalty purely for 
the purposes of securing the advantage of having a death-qualified jury,33 subject a broader 
swath of the population to exclusion than the aforementioned studies even accounted for. It is 
also interesting to note that the latter practice may corroborate such studies’ findings with regard 
to death-qualified juries being conviction-prone and biased toward the prosecution.34 Finally, 
although the process of death-qualification is intended to disqualify not only those who would 
refuse to impose the death penalty, but also those who regard it as the only acceptable 
                                                        
29 See, e.g., Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, supra note 10; Jurow, supra note 10; Craig Haney, On the 
Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAW AND HUM. 
BEHAV. 121 (1984). 
 
30 See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 192 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Finch & Ferraro, 
The Empirical Challenge to Death Qualified Juries: On Further Examination, 65 NEB. L. REV. 21, 63 
(1986). 
31 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 191-92 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For evidence that this is taking place, see, for 
example, Eric Schnapper, Taking Witherspoon Seriously: The Search for Death-Qualified Jurors, 62 
TEXAS L. REV. 977, 993-1032 (1984). 
32 Bruce J. Winick, Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases: An Empirical Study 
and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 39 (1982). 
33 David Lindorff, Aiming for a Conviction, NATION, at http://www.thenation.com/article/aiming-
conviction (May 20, 2011). 
34 See Richard Salgado, Tribunals Organized to Convict: Searching for A Lesser Evil in the Capital Juror 
Death-Qualification Process in United States v. Green, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 519, 532 (2005). 
9 
punishment for murder, studies have shown that many individuals who hold the latter view still 
end up serving on juries.35 
Other criticisms against death-qualification have taken a variety of different forms, 
ranging from appeals to the spirit of the criminal jury as envisioned by the founding fathers of 
the Constitution,36 to strictly practical arguments based on judicial economy.37 Despite the 
numerosity and variety of arguments against death-qualification, however, the Supreme Court 
has upheld its practice. 
 
C. Lockhart v. McCree 
 
 In Witherspoon, the defendant introduced a handful of social scientific studies suggesting 
that juries from which those who oppose the death penalty are excluded may be, on average, 
significantly more likely to convict than those that include such individuals. The Witherspoon 
Court dismissed the evidence as “too tentative and fragmentary to established that the jurors not 
opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the determination of guilt.”38 As the 
Court was careful to add, however: 
[A] defendant convicted by [a death-qualified] jury in some future case might still 
attempt to establish that the jury was less than neutral with respect to guilt . . . [and if] 
he were to succeed . . . the question would then arise whether the State’s interest in 
submitting the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital punishment may be 
vindicated at the expense of the defendant’s interest in a completely fair determination 
of guilt or innocence . . .  39 
                                                        
35 Theodore Eisenberg, Stephen P. Garvey & Martin T. Wells, Forecasting Life and Death: Juror Race, 
Religion, and Attitude Toward the Death Penalty, 30 J. Legal Stud. 277, 309-10 (2001). 
36 See G. Ben Cohen & Robert J. Smith, The Death of Death-Qualification, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 87 
(2008). 
37 E.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 204 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
38 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 517 (1968). 
39 Id. at 520 n.18. 
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Eighteen years later, the Court did revisit the issue in Lockhart v. McCree.40 The literature on the 
topic of the attitudes and composition of death-qualified juries, formerly “tentative and 
fragmentary,” had meanwhile developed into a body of nearly three dozen studies,41 all affirming 
the same key findings discussed earlier.42 Not a single study existed that contradicted these 
findings.43 
 Nevertheless, a sharply-divided court held that death-qualification is permitted under the 
Constitution. It charged the studies with a number of methodological flaws,44 but stated that even 
if the studies were valid and sound in their conclusions, mere conviction-proneness was not 
enough to contravene the Constitutional guarantee to an impartial jury, because “an impartial 
jury consists of nothing more than ‘jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the 
facts.’”45 The Court further stated that the fair cross-section requirement only applies to jury 
venires, not to the composition of petit juries themselves,46 but that even if it did, Witherspoon-
excludables do not qualify as the sort of “ ‘distinctive’ group in the community”47 whose 
systematic exclusion the requirement is designed to protect. 
 Justice Marshall, joined with Justices Brennan and Stevens, wrote a long, forceful 
dissent, arguing that the studies are methodologically sound and provide ample evidence to 
indicate a blatant Constitutional violation.48 Numerous critics have agreed.49 Still, chances that 
                                                        
40 476 U.S. 162. 
41 See Brief for Amicus Curiae American Psychological Association in Support of Respondent at i, 
Lockhart, 476 U.S. 162 (No. 84-1865) (listing studies in Table of Authorities). 
42 See supra Part II.B. 
43 See Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 238 (8th Cir. 1985). 
44 See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168-173. 
45 Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 178 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985)) (emphasis added). 
46 Id. at 173 (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 363-34 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 
538 (1975)). 
47 Id. at 174 (quoting Duren, 439 U.S. at 364). 
48 Id. at 184-206 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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the Court will revisit the issue any time soon and reverse its previous finding may be slim at 
best.50 Nevertheless, as one critic points out, just because the Supreme Court has refrained from 
declaring death-qualification unconstitutional does not make it the “fairest” approach, and as 
such, we ought still to consider what other approaches might be available to balance the State’s 
interests with those of the defendant.51 
 
III. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS AND WHY THEY FALL SHORT 
A number of possible alternatives to the death-qualification scheme upheld by the court 
have been proposed by critics concerned by its numerous shortcomings. Most, however, only 
address the problem as it arises with regards to the guilt-determining jury. The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts, concerned with judicial economy as much as fairness, 
considered a couple possible reforms of this variety in a 2004 case, United States v. Green.52 The 
first alternative would be to empanel a non-death-qualified jury for the guilt phase, while also 
picking the maximum number of alternates allowed, and then, if the trial needed to proceed onto 
the penalty phase, death qualifying that jury and as many alternates as necessary to assemble a 
new jury.53 The second alternative would to be empanel an entirely new jury to determine 
penalty post-conviction, and only death-qualifying that one.54 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
49 E.g., Maury Albon Hubbard III, Lockhart v. Mccree: Death Qualification of Jury Prior to Guilt Phase 
of Bifurcated Capital Trial Held Constitutional, 66 N.C. L. REV. 183 (1987); Michael W. Peters, 
Constitutional Law: Does "Death Qualification' Spell Death for the Capital Defendant's Constitutional 
Right to an Impartial Jury? (Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986)), 26 WASHBURN L.J. 382 
(1987). 
50 Subsequent cases have lent support to such a supposition. See Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007) 
(upholding dismissal of a potential juror who said she could vote for the death penalty); Buchanan v. 
Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987) (finding no constitutional right to a non-death qualified jury, even for a 
co-defendant not facing the death penalty). 
51 Salgado, supra note 33, at 522. 
52 324 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D. Mass. 2004). 
53 Id. at 331. 
54 Id. 
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 Both of these alternatives suffer from a number of deficiencies.55 Some of the problems 
could be alleviated with some slight modifications, such as, in the case of the first method, to ask 
the questions relevant to death-qualification during the initial voir dire, but to refrain from using 
that information until the jury must be reconvened for the penalty-phase,56 or, in the case of the 
second, empanelling two juries, one death-qualified and one not, simultaneously, and allowing 
both to view the guilt phase of the trial, having the death-qualified jury take over to determine 
the penalty in the case of a conviction by the non-death-qualified jury.57 Both of these proposed 
alternatives address some of the concerns of each of the methods they modify, while leaving 
others intact. 
 The main problem I perceive with all these methods, however, is that while they address 
part of the problem of death-qualification, that it results in juries who may be biased and 
unrepresentative and allows them to determine guilt or innocence of criminal defendants, they 
ignore an equally problematic consequence: that it then allows such juries to determine whether 
the defendant will live or die. For this reason, I advocate a method that eliminates the need for 
death-qualification altogether.58 
 
IV. MY PROPOSAL: THE NONUNANIMOUS SENTENCING JURY 
 One of the amici briefs filed in support of the respondent-defendant McCree pointed out a 
number of trial schemes that would eliminate the need for death-qualification while still 
protecting the State’s interests. Among the possible solutions enumerated was that of a 
                                                        
55 For a summary, see Salgado, supra note 33 at 538-49. 
56 To solve the problems caused by questioning jurors about their ability to sentence the defendant to 
death after they have already sat through the guilt phase of the trial. See id. at 547-51, for a summary of 
such problems and the reasons in support of such an alternative method. 
57 To solve the judicial economy problems associated with having to repeat part of the trial. Such scheme 
was employed in People v. Carpenter, 935 P.2d 708, 726-27 (Cal. 1997).  
58 See infra Part IV.A-B. 
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“nonunanimous sentencing jury.”59 This suggestion, while presumably permissible under the 
Constitution,60 has so far received little attention among critics of death-qualification. Part of this 
may be due to the widely-held notion that the unanimity requirement exists as one of the few 
safeguards afforded to defendants in capital trials, and not something to be given up lightly.61 
Properly construed, however, I believe that eliminating this requirement in the penalty phase 
provides the best solution to the conflict of interests that death-qualification is meant to resolve, 
without its many problems. In this Part, I will start by outlining the contours of my proposed 
solution, then I will consider the arguments both in favor and against such an approach, and why 
I think the arguments in favor prevail. 
 
A. The Specifics 
 
 My proposal is a narrow one. First and foremost, it would be predicated on the condition 
that no death-qualification take place at all,62 allowing even those jurors whose opposition to the 
death penalty rises to such a level that they could never impose it to serve on the jury. Second, 
the guilt-innocence phase of the trial would still require a unanimous verdict. Third, the penalty 
determination would require a supermajority of at least nine jurors. 
                                                        
59 Brief of Amici Curiae at 42, Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (No. 84-1865). 
60 The Supreme Court has held, in both Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), and Johnson v. 
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), that the Constitution does not require unanimity to convict. Furthermore, 
the Florida death penalty statute, FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2009), which so far has not been deemed 
unconstitutional, allows for the majority in capital juries to return an advisory verdict with respect to 
penalty. 
61 See, e.g., Raoul G. Cantero & Robert M. Kline, Death Is Different: The Need for Jury Unanimity in 
Death Penalty Cases, 22 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 4, (2009). 
 
62 This excludes the inquiry of the potential jurors ability to fairly determine guilt and innocence. See 
supra note 8. 
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 The reason for the first qualification should be obvious: my proposal suggests 
nonunanimity in the penalty phase primarily as a means to eliminate the practice of death-
qualification. I agree with critics of the Florida Death Penalty statute63 who regard unanimity at 
the penalty phase as an essential safeguard against what becomes an otherwise all-too-easy 
process of condemning a man to death.64 I do not believe, however, that such a safeguard 
remains necessary once the jury includes individuals representing all views on the death penalty 
opinion spectrum, for reasons that I will soon develop more fully. 
 I do still, however, believe that the safeguard of unanimity should still be regarded as 
necessary for conviction, and because I think lowering the bar would not serve any legitimate 
state interest in the same way that lowering the bar for the penalty determination would, I would 
adamantly insist that conviction remain a unanimous decision. 
 A mere simple majority should not be enough, however. A supermajority should be 
required, to foster more discussion and agreement among jurors. I have selected nine as the 
number as a compromise between the State’s and society’s interests: anything higher might 
reintroduce the State’s concerns about it not in practice being possible to secure a death penalty, 
while anything lower might reduce the need for deliberations to an unacceptable level.65 
 
B. The Merits 
 
 With these stipulations in mind, I will provide a brief overview of the numerous 
advantages that such a trial scheme might afford.  
                                                        
63 FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2009) 
64 See, e.g. Cantero & Kline supra note 60; Tayor-Thompson, supra note 27. 
65 For further discussion addressing the value of jury deliberations, see infra Part IV.C. 
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 First, it gets rid of the need for death-qualification, and in so doing, eliminates many of 
the problems arising from this process. The State’s worry about a lone death penalty opponent 
being able to undermine the will of the legislature by categorically refusing to impose the penalty 
could be put to rest, because it would take a plurality of the jury feeling that way for such a result 
to occur. Because this stated purpose for death-qualification would no longer exist, there would 
be no legitimate ground for excluding death penalty opponents based on their views, allowing for 
defendants to be tried and sentenced by juries better approximating the constitutional ideals of 
representativeness and impartiality. 
 Second, allowing the penalty to be determined by a supermajority of a jury on which all 
views are represented aligns with the idea that such a determination should reflect the 
“conscience of the community” much better than do other schemes. The proposals mentioned in 
Part III all fall far short of such an ideal in that each would still allow for this determination to be 
made by a group of people from which a significant portion of the community had been 
excluded. This is problematic in that, no matter the scheme employed by a given state, there is no 
objective right or wrong to the penalty determination: by continually upholding the unfettered 
right of the defense to introduce all and any evidence it wishes in mitigation,66 and by 
maintaining that any death penalty statute should provide a vehicle for the jury to exercise mercy 
in sentencing,67 the Court has ensured that the penalty determination is a largely subjective one. 
As such, the community’s personal convictions and views should not only be permitted to play a 
role in the penalty determination, but should be viewed as essential ingredient for its validity. 
 Finally, while jury unanimity, as a general principle, has much to recommend it, it also 
carries with it some problems, which my approach could help resolve. One such problem is the 
                                                        
66 See Tennard v. Dretke, 524 U.S. 274 (2004) (finding that there need not be a logical nexus between 
mitigating factors and the crime). 
67 See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586; Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782. 
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issue of hung juries, which can cost considerable time and resources by requiring a new trial. 
Some critics might argue that a hung jury is preferable to a jury returning a verdict that has not 
obtained a consensus, but this argument falls flat when one considers that the disagreement at 
issue will still be resolved in one way or another, and no matter what, some of the jurors will not 
agree with the outcome. The only difference between this result and one determined by a 
nonunanimous jury is that in the latter case, we can at least be sure that the ultimate outcome will 
satisfy most, if not all, of its the members. 
 Furthermore, a unanimous verdict returned by a jury does not, in reality, necessarily 
mean that all jurors truly agreed. In order to discourage hung juries in the interests of judicial 
economy, a jury that cannot agree on a verdict is often given what is known colloquially as a 
“dynamite charge,” stern instructions aimed at pressuring them into reaching a decision.68 Faced 
with tremendous pressure to agree, both from within the jury and without, many jurors may 
agree to go along with the majority in spite of their true convictions, creating only an “illusion of 
consensus” where none in fact exists. 69  
 The fact that jurors might be voting insincerely in order to achieve unanimity is 
especially concerning with regards to something like the penalty phase. The penalty 
determination is unique in that it tends to rely less on facts and the evidence, and more on the 
juror’s moral beliefs and convictions. While we might be able to regard the holdout juror who 
finally conforms to the majority on the issue of guilt or innocence as simply having given way to 
the strength of the evidence, an outcome that we can feel okay about, the holdout juror who 
conforms in the case of the penalty phase will more likely be giving way to the majority’s moral 
                                                        
68 Edward P. Schwartz and Warren F. Schwartz, And So Say Some of Us . . . What to Do When Jurors 
Disagree, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 429, 439 (2000). 
69 For a general overview of insincere voting and its implications, see Schwartz & Schwartz, supra note 
67, at 439-42. 
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convictions against their own deeply-held views, something with which we might not feel quite 
so alright. That this sort of thing occurs might help explain why many jurors who serve on 
capital trials look back on it as a traumatic experience that they may be unwilling to discuss with 
researchers.70 Relaxing the requirement of unanimity in the penalty phase might mitigate this 
problem by enabling divided juries to reach a verdict without necessarily requiring that anyone 
compromise on matters of personal conviction. Arguably, the trauma of being part of a jury that 
returns a verdict in opposition to one’s personal beliefs would not as extreme if one were at least 
allowed to stay true to those beliefs throughout the deliberations, rather than deny them in the 
interest of returning a verdict, as many jurors no doubt must do under the current scheme. 
 
 
C. Some Counter-Arguments and Responses 
 
 Having presented some of the merits of my proposal, I will now address some of the 
arguments that might be brought up in opposition. First, some critics who oppose the relaxation 
of unanimity requirements of juries in general may oppose my proposal for many of the same 
reasons. One argument put forth in opposition of allowing juries to render nonunanimous 
verdicts is that it has been found to severely curtail or even eliminate jury deliberations,71 which 
may result in the minority view not being given adequate voice or consideration. This is a 
problem both because it reduces the possibility that a small, but factually correct, minority may 
have the opportunity to bring to light considerations which may end up convincing the 
                                                        
70 Mark Costanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Phase: Legal 
Assumptions, Empirical Findings and a Research Agenda, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 185, 188 (1992). 
71 See, e.g., Reid Hastie, Steven D. Penrod & Nancy Pennington, INSIDE THE JURY (1983). But 
see Charlan Nemeth, Interactions Between Jurors as a Function of Majority vs. Unanimity Decision 
Rules, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 38, 50 (1977) (finding “no statistically significant difference between 
the groups assigned unanimity and those assigned majority rule” in a mock-jury experiment). 
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majority,72 and because, since both racial minorities and women73 tend to constitute the minority 
on even non-death-qualified jurors, these voices in particular may be silenced as the result of 
majority-rule juries.74  
 First and foremost, it is important to consider the uniqueness of the penalty phase in 
assessing the weight of such criticisms. In many if not most cases, deliberation will still be 
required to reach my proposed 9-3 majority because initial votes will not yield an outcome so 
heavily weighted in one direction, particularly with a jury representative of all views on the 
issue. If some cases in which the jury votes immediately, finds it already has the requisite 
majority, and abstains from further deliberations do occur, these cases, while not ideal, might not 
constitute such an evil as if this scenario were to occur in the guilt-innocence phase of a trial. 
This is for two reasons. First, chances are extremely slim that the 9-3 vote could turn into a 9-3 
vote in the other direction,75 and whereas the rare occasions in which a small minority triumphs 
over the majority may often be seen as an indication that the minority was correct in its judgment 
and must have persuaded the majority by presenting facts, evidence or other considerations that 
they missed—an indication, in other words, that truth prevailed—the triumph of the minority 
over the majority in the penalty phase may be viewed a bit differently. Being a necessarily more 
subjective determination, jurors’ views on the appropriate penalty are more often informed by 
deep-seated moral convictions about justice and moral desert not likely to respond to reason. As 
                                                        
72 See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, THE AMERICAN JURY 490 (Univ. of Chicago Press 1971) (1966) 
(observing that initial minority succeeds in convincing the majority about 10% of the time). 
73 See, e.g., Randall Kennedy, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW 232 (1997); Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. 
Butler, Sources of Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 NAT'L BLACK 
L.J. 238, 264 (1994). 
 
74 See Tayor-Thompson, supra note 27, at 1264. This argument assumes of course that these groups hold 
in common some particular views, id. 1278-79.  
75 See Eisenberg, Garvey & Wells, supra note 34, at 303-305 (showing that out of 53 capital cases 
examined, an initial vote in which at least ten jurors with respect to penalty was determinative of the 
penalty ultimately selected 100% of the time). 
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such the triumph of the minority over the majority in such a determination might more accurately 
reflect the victory of particularly vocal, adamant, or persuasive minority over what would 
otherwise be the will of the majority. Since the will of the majority more accurately represents 
the conscious of the community, I am not convinced this possibility is something worth 
safeguarding, given the potential costs. Second, while the refusal of even a couple of jurors to 
agree on the conviction of a defendant considerably undermines the notion that the prosecution 
really did succeed in proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (the logic being that if it was so 
obvious that no reasonable doubts should be entertained, why do not all the jurors agree?), the 
dissent of even three members of a jury with regards to the penalty should not be as concerning, 
since the appropriate penalty, unlike the more objective issue of whether or not a defendant 
committed a particular crime, is largely a matter of judgment. In a community composed of a 
diversity of viewpoints, it should not be worrying that not all its members can agree on such a 
determination. 
 Furthermore, this argument assumes that nothing can be done to foster jury deliberation 
apart from requiring unanimity. Judges can advise juries that part of their job is to listen to the 
viewpoints of one another, perhaps directing them to focus on the evidence presented in 
aggravation and mitigation and their initial leanings in the early stages of deliberation, while 
refraining from taking a vote until later on.76 
In the end, procedures designed to safeguard jurors’ entitlement to be heard during 
deliberations, while important, should not exist to the exclusion of procedures that would 
safeguard citizens’ entitlement to serve on a jury in the first place. If jury unanimity is at odds 
with allowing individuals representing a range of viewpoints onto the jury in the first instance, 
                                                        
76 See, Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1169, 1191 
(1995) (suggesting these among other possible reforms for encouraging deliberation in the absence of 
unanimity). 
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the former should be the one to yield. 
The embedded concern, that if the need for juries to deliberate is reduced, it might hit 
women and racial minorities the hardest, merits due consideration. However, I believe that the 
fact that women and minorities are underrepresented is a problem in its own right that can and 
should be addressed through other measures, including, perhaps, severely limiting the 
peremptory challenges each side is allowed to exercise in jury selection. In the context of capital 
trials, furthermore, the elimination of the unanimity requirement at the penalty phase in exchange 
for the abolition of death-qualification should actually result on more women and minorities 
being able to serve on the jury than would otherwise, these groups being among those most 
frequently excludable under the procedure.  
The other concern that might be voiced in opposition to my proposal might be that, 
although it addresses the State’s interest with regards to ensuring that its death penalty statute is 
not invalidated by a lone holdout juror, it does not properly vindicate the State’s interest in 
obtaining only jurors able to “follow the law” (despite the fact that such jurors would state that 
they could be impartial and unbiased with regards to guilt and innocence, as well as follow the 
judge’s instructions). The argument behind this claim would be that the law implicitly requires 
that jurors’ minds not be made up beforehand about any aspect of the trial, and that this includes 
the penalty.77 Considering the personal and often deeply-held nature of beliefs about the 
appropriate penalty in any given case, however, one might question whether such a rule is 
appropriate with respect to this particular aspect. If mercy as a grounds for a penalty less than 
death is to be always an option available to the jury, without requiring further justification, why 
preclude that mercy from being a more generalized mercy to all perpetrators of heinous crimes, 
                                                        
77 Some states might even do so explicitly. See Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 (1980) (noting that the 
Illinois law in effect at the time of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, (1968) “required the jury at least 
to consider the death penalty”). 
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no matter the particular details of the case? Whether the reason for returning a verdict less than 
death comes from a conviction that the particular defendant on trial does not deserve to be killed 
at the hands of the state, or from a conviction that no human being deserves to be killed at the 
hands of the state, is not, in my view, particularly important given the nature of the determination 




 Given the prolific body of evidence suggesting the limitations of death-qualification, the 
courts and legislatures should view it as a duty, notwithstanding the ruling of the Supreme Court, 
to consider alternatives. Because the problems of impartiality and unrepresentativeness of the 
death-qualified jury affect the defendant not only at the guilt phase, but also at the penalty phase 
of the capital trial, alternatives that eliminate the need for death-qualification at both stages 
should be afforded special attention. In this paper, I have presented one such possible approach. 
Though because of a dearth of research on the particular non-death-qualified, nonunanimous 
penalty jury that my approach would introduce necessitated that many of my arguments were 
speculative, I believe strongly that it holds promise, and hope that such a scheme may be the 
subject of further research and consideration in the future. 
